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The ability to delegate control over repetitive tasks from higher to lower neural
centers may be a fundamental innovation in human cognition. Plausibly, the massive
neurocomputational challenges associated with the mastery of balance during the
evolution of bipedality in proto-humans provided a strong selective advantage to
individuals with brains capable of efficiently transferring tasks in this way. Thus, the
shift from quadrupedal to bipedal locomotion may have driven the rapid evolution of
distinctive features of human neuronal functioning. We review recent studies of functional
neuroanatomy that bear upon this hypothesis, and identify ways to test our ideas.
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INTRODUCTION
Identifying the adaptive significance of trait variation is a pri-
mary challenge for evolutionary biology, and few traits have
attracted as much speculation as the wide gap in cognitive skills
(as reflected in complex language, tool use, etc.) between Homo
sapiens and all other extant taxa (Faure et al., 2005; Poldrack
et al., 2005; Ramnani, 2006; Passingham, 2008; Doyon et al., 2009;
D’Angelo and Casali, 2012). Notwithstanding increasing evidence
of high-level cognition in non-humans (Doya, 2000; Mithen,
2005; Poldrack et al., 2005; Vanderschuren and Di Ciano, 2005;
Graybiel, 2008; MacNeilage, 2008; Passingham, 2008; Doyon
et al., 2009), no other taxon exhibits the same cognitive capaci-
ties as our own species. The fossil record reveals a rapid increase
in brain size and complexity (plausibly reflecting an increase in
cognitive ability) approximately 2.4 million years ago, soon after
humans evolved another distinctive feature–bipedal locomotion
(Alexander et al., 1986; Faure et al., 2005; Lewin, 2009; Ashby
et al., 2010).
We suggest that bipedality directly favored a specific mech-
anism for neuronal functioning, which subsequently facilitated
the rapid evolution of increased cognitive capacity in hominids.
Our hypothesis differs from earlier speculations on the origins of
human intelligence by focusing on a specific and distinctive aspect
in which human cognition differs from that of other species
(in degree if not in kind), and in identifying a potential selec-
tive advantage to the elaboration of that mechanism for neural
functioning.
First, what is distinctive about the way in which the human
brain functions, relative to other species? The large behavioral
repertoire of humans leaves no doubt that the human brain dif-
fers from that of our closest evolutionary relatives (Smaers et al.,
2012). However, comparative neurological studies demonstrate
that the human brain does not contain any structures that are
distinctly unique to humans. Rather, the brain has undergone
expansion of pre-existing structures that have re-wired their con-
nectivity (Mantini and Corbetta, 2013; Smaers and Soligo, 2013),
leading to the creation of novel network architectures in the
brain. Given this morphological conservatism, the distinctive
features of the human brain are likely to involve the elabora-
tion of pre-existing functions to facilitate increased behavioral
complexity.
Most previous hypotheses about the evolution of distinctively
human patterns of cognitive function have glossed over the nature
of the differences, focusing instead on somewhat vague concepts
like “greater intelligence.” That is, previous hypotheses have been
predicated on the simplistic assumption that human brains some-
how work “better” than the brains of our nearest relatives, at
least when dealing with complex tasks, without identifying spe-
cific aspects either of brain function or of the morphological
underpinnings of that function. Instead, they have focused on
potential factors that allowed or favored an expansion in brain
size relative to body size, and/or conferred a survival or reproduc-
tive advantage to individual proto-humans with “better” brains.
These authors have identified many ecological, behavioral and
physiological factors that may have favored increases in cognitive
capacities in the human brain. Those factors include the expand-
ing array of habitats and behavioral niches occupied by proto-
humans (Laland et al., 2000), the advent of language (Häberling
et al., 2010), increased levels of fatty acids in the diet (Crawford,
1992), increased group size (Laland et al., 2010), changes in cli-
mate (Ash and Gallup, 2007), and modified targets and intensity
of sexual selection (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007a). However, many of
these theories are difficult to falsify, becausemost identify a simple
increase in “intelligence” or “cognitive ability” as the biological
trait under selection.
To explain the large behavioral differences that exist between
humans and our closest relatives, an effective theory of brain evo-
lution should specifically consider both what has changed and
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why that change may have conferred an adaptive advantage to the
individuals who exhibited the benefit. There is unlikely to be any
simple answer to the question: “how do human brains function
differently than those of our closest relatives?” Previous attempts
to explain the distinctive behavioral capacities of humans have
suggested that an increase in overall brain size relative to body
size was the key evolutionary change. However, comparative anal-
yses have questioned the validity of that putative “novel feature”
of human brain size (Deaner et al., 2007; Dunbar and Shultz,
2007b). Other researchers have suggested that cortical expansion
may have increased the information-processing capacities of the
brain (Hill et al., 2010), or that the unique capacities of the human
brain are achieved via an abundance of cortical architecture that
can be utilized for abstract planning and processing (Buckner and
Krienen, 2013). Although all of these factors may play a role, we
have chosen to focus instead on a specific way in which our brains
function, as it is the functioning of the brain that is exposed to the
forces of natural selection.
We suggest that one of the most fundamental distinguish-
ing characteristics of human cognition is the way in which the
brain dynamically shifts the way in which it deals with repeti-
tive tasks. When we first encounter a daunting task that requires
complex responses to multiple inputs (say, driving a car, or learn-
ing to play a musical instrument), we concentrate on that task
to the exclusion of almost everything else. Gradually, as we learn
the appropriate motor responses to specific situations (presum-
ably via an increase in rewarding feedback), we no longer need
to devote our full attention to the performance of the task, and
can instead focus on other issues. With increasing practice, the
basic activities become “automatic,” freeing attentional resources
that are only required when some unpredictable (or unusually
challenging) situation arises.
Although the process of tasks becoming “fond nature” is
familiar to all of us, scientific understanding of the mecha-
nisms involved in this delegation of authority from one neural
component to another is only just emerging (Alexander et al.,
1986; Faure et al., 2005; Poldrack et al., 2005; Mithen, 2005;
Ito, 2006; Graybiel, 2008; MacNeilage, 2008; Passingham, 2008;
Doyon et al., 2009; Lewin, 2009; Balsters and Ramnani, 2011;
Seger and Spiering, 2011). When a challenge is first encountered,
it needs to be processed by a rapid and flexible system capable of
analysing complex patterns and responding with a wide array of
behavioral responses, each of which conveys its own precise prob-
abilistic advantage for success (Alexander et al., 1986; Poldrack
et al., 2005). However, once feedback has been received and the
challenge has been mastered (to the point that the brain can accu-
rately predict the optimal response to most situations that are
likely to arise), the control of the task is then relegated to a “lower”
level, outside of conscious control (Alexander et al., 1986; Hoshi
et al., 2005; Poldrack et al., 2005; Doyon et al., 2009).
THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND HUMAN BRAIN EVOLUTION
Although many species can transfer behavior from volitional
to habitual function (Poldrack et al., 2005; Barton, 2007; Seger
and Spiering, 2011; Krubitzer and Seelke, 2012; Barton and
Venditti, 2013), the shift from quadrupedal to bipedal loco-
motion nonetheless may have been a powerful driver for the
rapid elaboration of the distinctively human “delegation” mode
of information processing. Bipedality is rare in mammals, seen
commonly only in humans and in some apes (Hardman et al.,
2002; Alexander, 2004; Doyon et al., 2009). Although bipedal-
ity plausibly affords a number of adaptive advantages (e.g., it
facilitates surveillance in densely vegetated areas, and frees the
arms for other tasks Carrier, 2011), it also imposes a massive
information-processing challenge. Compared to the stability con-
ferred by quadrupedal locomotion, a bipedal organism rests its
body mass on only two support points. This inherently unsta-
ble posture means that even a tiny shift in position will cause
a fall, unless the animal instantly detects and responds to that
change. Presumably for this reason, quadrupedal animals that
resort to bipedality for surveillance typically do so only briefly, or
in highly stereotyped poses (as is the case with meerkats). Moving
about while bipedal poses extraordinary challenges, whereby the
individual must constantly respond to ever-changing subtle shifts
in weight distribution (Preuschoft, 2004), reducing its ability to
attend to other aspects of its environment (such as the detection
of food sources or approaching predators).
Despite these challenges, adult humans spend little time con-
sciously thinking about maintaining their balance as they move
around, except when placed in a challenging circumstance, such
as walking on a narrow beam or when leaving a pub. The means
of achieving that liberation is very clear as one watches a young
child learning to walk. This is a long process, with every step ini-
tially requiring full concentration. Through time, however, the
skills develop as control over fine motor movements improves–
and full concentration on movement is no longer needed as the
tasks involved become “automatized” and are delegated to other
parts of the brain, such as the basal ganglia (Poldrack et al.,
2005; Ashby et al., 2010; Seger and Spiering, 2011; Sepulcre et al.,
2012) and the cerebellum (Duncan, 2001; Desmurget and Turner,
2010; Balsters and Ramnani, 2011; Callu et al., 2013). Plausibly,
then, the adoption of bipedalism in proto-humans posed a strong
selective advantage for individuals with brains capable of using
their full processing power to learn bipedalism, but that were
also able to delegate the basic tasks of walking and running to
“lower” neural centers, freeing up the higher segments for detect-
ing unpredictable opportunities and challenges (be they related
to predators, food, or social cues), and rapidly responding to that
information.
In summary, we suggest that (1) the ability to delegate rou-
tine tasks from the cortex to other parts of the brain is more
highly developed in humans than other species; and (2) that
elaboration arose during our evolutionary history because the
computational challenges associated with balancing on two legs
enhanced individual fitness in proto-humans who were capable of
transferring the control of routine tasks in this way. To this we can
add (3) that once this “delegation” mode of neural functioning
had evolved, it was co-opted for many other cognitive tasks–
essentially, liberating the cortex to deal with novel unpredictable
events.
Once a “delegation” system has evolved, the resultant circuitry
can be co-opted for aspects of brain function other than simply
motor movements. For example, humans probably deal with cog-
nitive and emotional issues inmuch the same way (i.e., events that
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initially require full concentration, ultimately become processed
subconsciously after frequent repetition Hikosaka et al., 1999;
Lehericy et al., 2005; Mainzer, 2008; Hertel and Brozovich, 2010).
Automatization also enables complex activities to be performed
even during periods of extreme stress, when flexible cortical net-
works are overwhelmed but the cerebellum remains functional
(Chandler et al., 2013). What parts of the human brain might
fulfill these functions? Below, we review evidence as to the likely
anatomical and functional basis for such a system.
MAPPING BEHAVIOR TO BRAIN CIRCUITRY
Because a diverse suite of behaviors become automatic with prac-
tice, we doubt that these increases in behavioral capacity were
driven by the evolutionary expansion of a single neural structure
(Barton and Harvey, 2000; Weaver, 2005; Barton and Venditti,
2013; Smaers and Soligo, 2013). Instead, this flexibility was likely
driven by the dimensional expansion of a pre-existing organiz-
ing principle for the brain. To achieve efficient automatization,
such a neural system would require a unique set of traits. Early
in the course of learning, the system would require ready access
to moment-to-moment reinforcement signals. In addition, the
behavioral capacities in the early stages should also be flexible,
providing a large array of potential behaviors with which to learn
themost effective strategy. Over the course of learning, this system
should trade off flexibility for consistency, while also incorporat-
ing feedback in different ways, such as through small errors in
action prediction rather than in the outcome of reinforcement tri-
als (Frank, 2005; Hikosaka et al., 2008). Lastly, the system would
require global access to all of the behavioral capacities of the brain,
as there is now compelling evidence that automatization can
occur in many non-motor functions, such as cognition (Graybiel,
1997) and perception (Bastian, 2011; Baumann and Mattingley,
2014), which utilize vastly different neural architectures.
A plausible candidate system that simultaneously achieves
each of these capacities is that of the cortico-cerebellar pathways
(Weaver, 2005; Balsters et al., 2010; Smaers et al., 2011, 2013;
Koziol et al., 2014). This system connects large regions of the
cerebral cortex, which is characterized by flexible and rapid pro-
cessing, with the cerebellum, which is responsible for habitual and
inflexible processing (see Figure 1). In combination, the cerebral
cortex and the cerebellum contain more than 70% of the neu-
rons in the human brain (Shepherd, 2004) and are connected
through a series of reciprocal loops, which themselves broadly
map onto the functional capacities of the human brain (e.g.,
motor functions rely on caudal cortex and anterior cerebellum
structures, whereas cognitive capacities rely on dorsolateral cortex
and posterior cerebellum) (Figure 1) (Bostan et al., 2010, 2013).
Despite their connectivity with each other, the cerebral cortex
and cerebellum are organized into quite different motifs of inter-
nal connectivity (Ito, 2006). For example, the cerebral cortex is
a thin, multi-layered sheet with massive inter-connectivity across
layers and regions (George and Hawkins, 2009), whereas the cere-
bellum consists of a network of simple cellular motifs, robustly
repeated across the entire structure (Ramnani, 2006; D’Angelo
and Casali, 2012). The structure of these motifs accords well with
the notion that the cerebral cortex is primarily engaged early
in unsupervised learning (when it is advantageous to respond
flexibly to a novel stimulus) (Doya, 2000), yet decreases its activ-
ity over the course of learning, which may be due to increased
neuronal efficiency (Ashby et al., 2007). In addition, it is also now
clear that the cerebellum is important for the execution of autom-
atized behaviors (Lang and Bastian, 2002; Balsters and Ramnani,
2011). Given the efficient neuronal architecture of the cerebellar
cortex, we propose that the cerebellum plays a prominent role in
the execution of learned behaviors, effectively liberating the more
flexible architecture of the cortex to process novel behavioral chal-
lenges (Figure 1). Importantly, this mechanism can be mapped
onto a functional corticocerebellar unit of the brain (Figure 1)
which, depending on which neural and cerebellar regions are
involved in the learning process, can effectively allow learning
and automatization of motor, as well as cognitive and affective
behavioral patterns (Graybiel, 1997, 2008; Hertel and Brozovich,
2010).
Despite convincing evidence that control over routine behav-
iors is gradually transferred from cortical to cerebellar circuitry
(Faure et al., 2005; Ito, 2006; Ramnani, 2006; Passingham, 2008;
Doyon et al., 2009; Balsters and Ramnani, 2011; D’Angelo and
Casali, 2012; Balsters et al., 2013), little is known about the
structures that mediate this transfer at the neural level. Such a
system would require anatomical connectivity between the cere-
bral cortex and the cerebellum, along with adequate exposure
to learning-related reward signals and signals related to environ-
mental salience. The basal ganglia (a collection of highly con-
served neural structures in the telencephalon) are ideally placed
to fulfill these functions (Alexander et al., 1986; Doya, 2000; Faure
et al., 2005; Hoshi et al., 2005; Mithen, 2005; Poldrack et al., 2005;
Vanderschuren and Di Ciano, 2005; Graybiel, 2008; Passingham,
2008; Doyon et al., 2009; Lewin, 2009; Seger and Spiering, 2011).
The striatum, a prominent member of the basal ganglia, is con-
nected to the cerebral cortex and cerebellum in a gradient similar
to that displayed by the cortico-cerebellar system (Alexander
et al., 1986; Hardman et al., 2002; Alexander, 2004; Faure et al.,
2005; Hoshi et al., 2005; McHaffie et al., 2005; Poldrack et al.,
2005; Barton, 2007; Doyon et al., 2009; Lewin, 2009; Ashby
et al., 2010; Seger and Spiering, 2011; Krubitzer and Seelke, 2012;
Barton and Venditti, 2013) (Figure 1) and receives multiple sub-
cortical and brainstem inputs reflecting reward prediction error
(Alexander et al., 1986; Faure et al., 2005; Poldrack et al., 2005;
Mithen, 2005; Ito, 2006; Graybiel, 2008; Kreitzer and Malenka,
2008; MacNeilage, 2008; Passingham, 2008; Doyon et al., 2009;
Lewin, 2009; Balsters and Ramnani, 2011; Bromberg-Martin and
Hikosaka, 2011; Seger and Spiering, 2011) and salience signals
(Alexander et al., 1986; Poldrack et al., 2005; Bromberg-Martin
et al., 2010). We suggest that early in the course of learning, the
basal ganglia play an important role in training the cerebellum
to perform effective action sequences through reinforcement of
appropriate responses (Kawato et al., 2011). Once a behavior has
become automatized, the role of the basal ganglia nuclei then
shifts to a monitoring role, flexibly “switching” activity between
these two systems in the face of changing environmental circum-
stances (Figure 1), a task to which it is also neuro-anatomically
well suited (Aron et al., Saint-Cyr, 2003; Aron and Poldrack,
2006). The ability to efficiently and effectively “delegate” infor-
mation to automaticity over the course of learning thus depends
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FIGURE 1 | Hierarchical neural circuits that control learning in the
human brain. The cortex (green) is preferentially involved early in the course
of learning, allowing flexible responses to rapidly changing environmental
contingencies. Through extensive connections with the basal ganglia nuclei
(blue), which are under the regular influence of neuromodulatory signals
reflecting prediction error and salience, the cortex is able to transfer the
performance of complex tasks to rigid yet reproducible neuronal motifs
within the cerebellar cortex, which is “trained” by the neuromodulatory
signals and the basal ganglia to efficiently perform complex actions. The
connectivity of this motif is organized along a rostrocaudal gradient, with
rostral regions preferentially involved early in learning, and more caudal
structures in tasks that require less cognitive control. The wiring diagram of
this unit has been over-simplified to highlight the key circuitry responsible for
communication within the system.
on the interplay between cortical and cerebellar neurons through
their interconnections with the basal ganglia (see Figure 1).
We are not the first to suggest that the basal ganglia nuclei are
integrally involved in automatization. Indeed, early researchers
suggested that the basal ganglia may act as the neural substrate
of motor learning, with more dorsal regions responsible for the
initial learning of a behavior, and caudal regions becoming active
during the consolidation of habitual responses (Alexander et al.,
1986; Hoshi et al., 2005; Poldrack et al., 2005; Doyon et al.,
2009; Ashby et al., 2010). However, recent evidence suggests that
the basal ganglia are merely involved in the kinematic execu-
tion of motor patterns rather than in the storage of habits per se
(Poldrack et al., 2005; Barton, 2007; Desmurget and Turner, 2010;
Seger and Spiering, 2011; Krubitzer and Seelke, 2012; Barton and
Venditti, 2013), aiding in the “selection” of appropriate actions
based on environmental contingencies (Redgrave et al., 1999). In
this manner, the geographical differences in basal ganglia involve-
ment during motor learning can be explained by the response
of separate regions of the basal ganglia to unique spatial frames
of reference, with dorsal regions utilizing spatial reference and
caudal regions utilizing motoric reference (Hikosaka et al., 1999;
Hardman et al., 2002; Alexander, 2004; Lehericy et al., 2005;
Doyon et al., 2009). Alternatively, the ventral-to-dorsal gradi-
ent within the striatum may reflect preferential involvement with
goal-directed rather than habitual actions (Lehericy et al., 2005;
Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Hikosaka and Isoda, 2010). In either
case, the basal ganglia nuclei are likely to play an integral role in
the transfer of information from cortical to cerebellar circuitry
over the course of learning.
The modular architecture of these three inter-connected neu-
ral systems strongly supports the capacity for parallel processing
in the brain (Balleine and Ostlund, 2007; Isoda and Hikosaka,
2011). Also, structural studies indicate that these three units
are well conserved across the evolutionary history of mam-
mals (Poldrack et al., 2005; Barton, 2007; Balsters et al., 2010;
Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2011; Carrier, 2011; Seger and
Spiering, 2011; Krubitzer and Seelke, 2012; Barton and Venditti,
2013; Buckner and Krienen, 2013). That conservatism is con-
sistent with the idea that natural selection has elaborated a
pre-existing system, by modifying its functionality (rather than,
for example, by generating a novel structural component to the
brain). Thus, the major mechanism behind human behavioral
evolution may have been a shift in function rather than structure.
That is, the massive increase in information processing required
by bipedality conferred a selective advantage to responses at the
neural level that accelerated an individual’s capacity to “dele-
gate” information processing from conscious, flexible control into
more “automatic” systems that are rigid yet highly reproducible.
In keeping with this idea, anatomical studies have not dis-
covered entirely novel brain regions unique to humans; instead,
specific systems of the brain, including nuclei within the basal
ganglia (Hardman et al., 2002; Alexander, 2004; Preuschoft, 2004;
Doyon et al., 2009; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Sepulcre et al.,
2010) and connections between the anterior cerebral cortex and
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Evolutionary Psychology and Neuroscience April 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 90 | 4
Shine and Shine Evolution of cognitive mechanisms
the lateral cerebellum (Poldrack et al., 2005; Ashby et al., 2010;
Balsters et al., 2010; Carrier, 2011; Seger and Spiering, 2011;
Sepulcre et al., 2012; Buckner, 2013), have undergone massive
expansion and an increase in connectivity. These regions also
exhibit strong preferences for long-range connectivity (Duncan,
2001; Preuschoft, 2004; Desmurget and Turner, 2010; Sepulcre
et al., 2010; Balsters and Ramnani, 2011; Callu et al., 2013)
and multimodal information processing (Hikosaka et al., 1999;
Lehericy et al., 2005; Poldrack et al., 2005; Mainzer, 2008; Hertel
and Brozovich, 2010; Seger and Spiering, 2011; Sepulcre et al.,
2012), as expected if they play a critical role in adaptive behavior
(Barton and Harvey, 2000; Duncan, 2001; Weaver, 2005; Balsters
and Ramnani, 2011; Barton and Venditti, 2013; Callu et al., 2013;
Smaers and Soligo, 2013).
DOES THE BRAIN WORK AS A COMPUTER?
Although metaphors of brain function that invoke computers
are often criticized, an analogy with computer-based memory
may help to explain the concepts at the core of the “delegation”
hypothesis. The difference between the two major systems we
identify is similar to the difference between Rapid Access Memory
(RAM) and Read-Only Memory (ROM) in a computer. RAM is
a flexible and high capacity storage system that is adaptable to
multiple functions and can be rapidly modified by user-defined
processing decisions, whereas ROM is a rigid, inaccessible sys-
tem that performs automatic tasks but is outside the control of
the system operator. Viewed through this analogy, our hypothesis
suggests that the computational problems associated with bipedal
locomotion led to the development of a system that catalyzes the
“delegation” of behaviors fromRAM into ROM, effectively “hard-
wiring” rewarded behaviors into memory. By so doing, the brain
is able to release computational processing power for delegation
to other, more pressing tasks. Importantly, this analogy is about
function and not mechanism: we do not suggest that the com-
putational algorithms used by the human brain are similar to
those required for RAM and ROM. Indeed, it is far more likely,
based on the precise connectivity of the human brain, that the
process of “delegation” from goal-directed to habitual behavior
emerges as a function of complex dynamics within neuronal net-
works (Weaver, 2005; Mainzer, 2008; Balsters et al., 2010; Hertel
and Brozovich, 2010; Smaers et al., 2011, 2013).
This analogy also suggests the intriguing possibility that sub-
jective conscious experience is the “user interface” employed by
an organism—and that delegation of processing enables us to
be aware of (and thus, able to react to) only a small subset of
issues (those which benefit from rapid flexible decision-making).
In a computer, the user interface offers a simple and accessible
model for interacting with the software and hardware, with the
complex (and often incomprehensible) language of these systems
hidden from the user’s view. Such a system allows the apparent
mystery of subjective first-person consciousness to be reframed
as an organism’s individual schematic internal model of its own
attention, created by interactions between its own neural systems
(Bostan et al., 2010, 2013; Graziano and Kastner, 2011; Graziano,
2013). Similar to the computer analogy, the user interface only
affords access to the contents of RAM (i.e. goal-directed pro-
cesses), keeping the contents of ROM (i.e., habitual responses)
hidden deep within the “black box” and inaccessible to con-
sciousness. This analogy also is consistent with the notion that
subjective consciousness is not a capacity that divides humans
from other animals: instead, it is present across many mammals,
birds and even invertebrates (Edelman and Seth, 2009; George
and Hawkins, 2009). Importantly, we are not suggesting that the
human brain requires a “ghost in the machine” to work effec-
tively, rather that important aspects of conscious experience can
be conceptualized as the degree of access that an organism has
to its’ competing memory systems. Nonetheless, the systems that
the brain relies on to mediate our vast behavioral repertoire have
similarities with (as well as differences from) the memory sys-
tems of a computer. Recognizing those analogies may help us to
understand the far more complexmechanisms underlying human
cognition. Indeed, a particular strength of the proposed model is
that increasingly complex behaviors can emerge from this system
without the need for conscious control, as behaviors are dele-
gated to automaticity through repetition, and via minimization
of reinforcement-based error signals.
TESTABLE PREDICTIONS
How can we test the predictions of this model? Studies on brain
function have clarified themanner in which actions can shift from
goal-directed to habitual behavior (Poldrack et al., 2005), but
our hypothesis suggests a more prominent role for the cerebel-
lum (particularly as behaviors become more habitual and rigid)
than has been suggested by previous authors (Yin and Knowlton,
2006; Balleine and Delgado, 2007). We could test that predic-
tion by assessing the brain during the course of learning, using
a range of complementary neuroimaging techniques. In addition,
we know of no direct evidence that the shifting process occurs at a
more rapid rate ormore efficiently in humans than in non-human
species; however such a divergence is an explicit prediction of the
“delegation” hypothesis. If suitably framed, comparative learn-
ing studies in human and non-human primates could specifically
test that prediction. Our hypothesis also could be tested by
a detailed analysis of the brains of extant animals (especially
primates) as well as fossil braincases from proto-hominids, to
determine whether brain morphology covaries with the acquisi-
tion of bipedality, and/or the ability of different taxa to “delegate”
rewarded behaviors into automatic functions (Holloway et al.,
2004). On a genetic level, we expect that changes in delegation
ability should be mirrored by disproportionate alterations in both
coding and non-coding genetic activity in the brain (Mattick and
Mehler, 2008), particularly in the cortical, cerebellar and basal
ganglia circuitry that is likely to be important for the delegation
of behavior to automaticity (Figure 1). Although studies on the
genetic basis of human behavior are in their infancy, early results
on the neural distribution of non-coding regions in the genome
support this general notion (Mattick and Mehler, 2008).
We could also test the hypothesis by exploring variation in
behavior within humans. Notably, the neuroanatomical rela-
tionships described above could be explored in neurobiological
disorders—specifically, those in which individuals suffer from
impairments in automaticity. Preliminary evidence suggests, for
example, that patients with Parkinson’s disease (which is due
to impairments in the circuitry of the basal ganglia Dayan and
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Balleine, 2002; Poldrack et al., 2005; Obeso et al., 2008) exhibit
reduced development and recruitment of habitual behaviors
(Poldrack et al., 2005). In addition, patients with cerebellar lesions
also show deficits in the execution of automatic behaviors(Lang
and Bastian, 2002; Callu et al., 2013). Other neuropsychiatric
disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (Gillan et al.,
2011, 2013; Robbins et al., 2012) and post-traumatic stress dis-
order (Arnsten, 2009), may also be amenable to reconceptual-
isation through the framework of the “delegation” hypothesis.
Indeed, there is now evidence that patients with schizophrenia
have impaired habitual performance on cognitive tasks (Horan
et al., 2008; Wagshal et al., 2012), perhaps explaining why patients
with the disorder are impaired across multiple cognitive domains
(Fornito et al., 2011).
Our hypothesis also predicts significant phenotypic varia-
tion among healthy patients in the ability to delegate behav-
ior to automaticity. Specifically, we expect that the ability
to delegate behavior to automaticity may correlate with high
performance on the tests commonly used to measure general
intellectual expertise. Indeed, if variation in the ability to autom-
atize behavior does indeed underlie people’s differential perfor-
mance in cognitive tests, we would predict commonalities in the
brain-function mechanisms that confer expertise across multi-
dimensional domains, such as Art, Science and Music. If experts
in all these fields utilize similar brain mechanisms to achieve mas-
tery of their chosen task, which it appears as though they do
(Beilock and Lyons, 2012; Bilalic´ et al., 2012), the implications
for performance improvement (and remediation of poor perfor-
mance) are clear. Future studies using functional neuroimaging
could usefully investigate the precise spatiotemporal dynamics
that underlie the conversion from goal-directed to automatic
behaviors, as well as the relative role played by the cortex, basal
ganglia and cerebellum in the acquisition, execution and mainte-
nance of adaptive behavior.
Finally, our hypothesis predicts a tradeoff: the automatization
of behavior (1) should reduce an individual’s ability to con-
sciously attend to habitual function; and (2) enhance their ability
to react rapidly and effectively to novel (unexpected) inputs. For
example, habitual behaviors should be much less accessible to
conscious exploration than those behaviors that require flexible,
“on-line” control. Interestingly, the breakdown of this relation-
ship between conscious access and automaticity may explain the
well-documented phenomenon (known in the sporting world as
the “yips”) whereby an individual who inappropriately accesses a
usually habitual activity at a conscious level, can thereby commit
uncharacteristic errors (Beilock and Gray, 2007).
CONCLUSION
In summary, the massive neurocomputational challenges posed
by the onset of bipedality may have been the driving force behind
the rapid expansion of human cognitive capacity. Specifically, the
ability to rapidly “delegate” well-learned behaviors into subcon-
scious processes liberated higher neural centers to be available for
flexible, “on-line” processing of fitness-relevant stimuli. Our ideas
suggest several testable predictions and may clarify not only how
human cognitive systems differ from those of other species, but
also how the human brain works both in health and disease.
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